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LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD-
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION: A COMPARISON OF MARSCHALL V.
LAND NORDRHEIN- WESTFALEN AND
JOHNSON V. TRANSPOR TA TION AGENCY OF
SANTA CLARA COUNTY
I. INTRODUCTION
The European Court of Justice ("ECJ") has taken a dramatic step
towards leveling the playing field for women in the workplace. On
November 11, 1997, the ECJ decided the case of Marschall v. Land
Nordrhein-Westfallen,' a case rooted in the analysis of voluntary gender-
based affirmative action in the European Union.
This important ECJ decision originated in Germany when a male
schoolteacher was denied a promotion and claimed he had been
discriminated against on the basis of his sex.2
The Law on Civil Servants of Nordrhein-Westfalen provides that where
there are fewer women than men in a particular occupational bracket, a
woman will be givenjob preference "unless reasons specific to an individual
male candidate tilt the balance in his favor."3 The effect of this law is to
give an advantage to women candidates considered equal to men applying for
the same job.4 A savings clause allows an equally qualified man to get the
job if other factors tip the balance in his favor.5
1. Case C-409/95, Marschall v. Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1997 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 5439, at
*6.
2. See id.
3. Eva Brems, Comment, Hellmut Marschall v. Nordrhein- Westfalen, 4 COLUM J. EUR. L.
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The Verwaltungsgerict 6 found that Article 2(1) of the European
Community's ("EC") Equal Treatment Directive7 prohibited discrimination
against men.8 The case was then reviewed by the ECJ to clarify and ensure
that the proper decision had been rendered.9 The ECJ reversed, finding that
the savings clause laid out in the law sufficiently distinguished the Marschall
case from past rulings. °
The Equal Treatment Directive had previously been governed by the
case of Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, which struck down any "tie
break" schemes that would give automatic preference to women over equally
qualified male candidates." While the ECJ did not overrule the Kalanke
decision with Marschall, it distinguished the facts in such a way that
Marschall will now be the measuring stick against which all other
affirmative action cases in the European Union will be measured. 2
The United States has also struggled to define the requirements of
voluntary gender-based affirmative action programs. 3 In Johnson v.
Transportation Agency of Santa Clara County, the Supreme Court laid out
the requirements for granting preference to a female over a male candidate
for employment in the United States. 4 Here, the Court relied heavily upon
the test laid out in United States Steelworkers ofAmerica v. Weber, 5 as well
as its own balance of the rights of male versus female employees in voluntary
affirmative action programs. 6 In Johnson, the Supreme Court held that the
County Agency appropriately took into account, as one factor, the sex of the
female employee in determining whether to award a promotion. 7
6. The Verwaltungsgerict is a German administrative court which governs over Nordrhein-
Westfalen. See Brems, supra note 3, at 2.
7. Implementation of the Principle of Equal Treatment for Men and Women as Regards
to Employment, Vocational Training and Promotion and Working Conditions,Eur. Consult.
Ass., 39th Sess., Doc. No. 76/207/EEC (1976)[hereinafter Council Directive 76/207].
8. See Marshall, 1997 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 5439, at *1.
9. See id.
10. See Julie A. Mertus, Marschall v. Land Nordrhein- Westfalen, AM. J. INT'L L. 296, 299
(1997).
11. See Case C-450/93, Kalanke v. Freie Hansetadt Bremen, 1995 ECJ CELEX LEXIS
3928.
12. See Brems, supra note 3, at 672.
13. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency of Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
14. See id. at 626.
15. See United States Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
16. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 626.
17. See id. at 641.
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On its face, the Johnson decision looks quite similar to the ECJ's
holding in Marschall. 18 However, upon greater scrutiny, it becomes evident
that the ECJ has made it much easier for women to benefit from voluntary
gender-based affirmative action programs than has the United States
Supreme Court.
This Comment will show how the ECJ has articulated a standard that
benefits women far more than any guidelines established in the United States
regarding gender-based affirmative action programs. Part II of this Comment
will set out the factors that contributed to the Marschall decision and outline
the affirmative action guidelines in the European Union with reference to
gender. This Comment will argue that the decision reached by the ECJ was
a progressive one and that its liberal interpretation of the Equal Treatment
Directive was a far more equitable solution for women than the decision
reached in Kalanke.
Part III of this Comment will outline the affirmative action guidelines
in the United States, specifically with reference to gender. This Comment
will also analyze the decision in Johnson, focusing specifically on the
rationale and implications of the test it articulated. While not as restrictive
as the Kalanke decision, the United States Supreme Court's position on
affirmative action is far more conservative than that of the ECJ.
Part IV of this Comment will then analyze the differences in approach
to affirmative action taken by the Supreme Court and the ECJ, commending
the ECJ for its progressive treatment of women and revealing the United
States Supreme Court's lack of will to protect affirmative action programs.
This Comment will look at how the two courts define the standard for
discrimination and what parties they are really seeking to protect. For
example, the dissent by Justice Scalia in Johnson maintains that it is not clear
whether the victims are the women and minorities or the white males in the
workforce."
Finally, this Comment will conclude that the tests set forth in these
opinions produced workable and manageable standards. It will also look
ahead to consider whether they will prove impossible to enforce or will open
the doors that have previously been closed to women in both the United
States and the European Union.
18. Compare Johnson 480 U.S. 616 with Marschall, 1997 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 5439, at
*1.
19. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency of Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616, 656
(1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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I1. THE EUROPEAN UNION'S APPROACH TO GENDER-BASED
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
A. Leading up to the Equal Treatment Directive
The European Union ("EU") is an institution initially created to
economically unite the nations of Europe.2° In 1957, the original six members
of the EU ratified the Treaty of Paris creating the European Economic
Community ("EEC"). ' In addition to their national courts, the member
nations are also governed by decisions of the European Court of Justice.22
Article 177 of the EEC Treaty ensures that the ECJ enforces EU laws
uniformly and that EU law is applied consistently by the national courts.23
While the basis for the EEC Treaty was to promote economic relations
between the Member States, it contains several provisions outlining social
policies, specifically with regard to equality in the workforce. 4
Article 119 of the EEC Treaty outlines the requirements of "equal pay
for equal work." 5 Article 119 states that each member state must provide
equal pay for equal work between its male and female workers.26 However,
20. See Rebecca Means, Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen: The Significance of the
Kalanke Decision on Future Positive Action Programs in the European Union, 30 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1087 at 1090 (1997) (citing MARK A. KAUFMAN, THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY: AN ESSENTIAL GUIDE TOWARD KNOWING AND UNDERSTANDING THE EC 17
(1993)).
21. See id. at 1091. In 1951, the European Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC") was
established by the Treaty of Paris, and the EU was born uniting France, Germany, Italy,
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Id.
22. See id. at 1091. The ECJ is composed of fifteen judes (one from -each Of the m.mbr
states) and is responsible for "ensuring compliance with the economic and social purposes
of the EU, and providing uniform interpretation and application of EU law." Id.
23. See id. at 1105.
24. See id. at 1110.
25. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,298 U.N.T.S.
11, Art. 119 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
26. See id. The treaty provides that:
Each Member State shall in the course of the first stage ensure and subsequently
maintain the application of the principle of equal remuneration for equal work as
between men and women workers. For purposes of this Article, remuneration
shall mean the ordinary basic or minimum wage or salary and any additional
emoluments whatsoever payable directly or indirectly, whether in cash or in kind,
by the employer to the worker and arising out of the workers' employment.
Equal remuneration without discrimination based on sex means:
(a) that remuneration for the same work at piece-rates shall be
calculated on the basis of the same unit of measurement; and
(b) that remuneration for work at time-rates shall be the same for the
482 [Vol. 19
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adherence to Article 119 initially proved difficult.27 Member states often
found ways to controvert the statute by exploiting the vague definition of
"equal. 28
To help aid in enforcement, in 1976 the Council of the European
Community enacted the Equal Treatment Directive ("the Directive"), a
provision promoting equal access to employment for both men and women
alike.2 9 The Directive prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex, either
directly or indirectly." The Directive also stated that measures helping to
remove existing inequalities between men and women in the workplace
would be allowed.31
Specifically, Article 2(4) "expressly allows for the possibility of
preferential treatment and concomitantly positive action [herein known as
"affirmative action"] programs. 32 However, this Directive provided very
limited guidance as to the meaning of discrimination.33
B. Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen
The ECJ had its first opportunity in 1995 to decide whether affirmative
action programs comport with the Directive's explicit allowance for
preferential treatment.3 4 In Kalanke, two applicants, Mr. Kalanke and Ms.
Glissman, applied for the same position of Section Manager within the
Bremen Parks Department.35 Mr. Kalanke, who held a diploma in
Horticulture and Landscaping Gardening,3 6 had worked as a horticulture
employee in the Parks Department since 1973 and acted as permanent
same job. Id.
27. See Means, supra note 20, at 1112 (citing Sara P. Crovitz, Equal Pay in the European
Community: Practical and Philosophical Goals, 1992 U. CHi. LEGAL F. 477, 479 (1992)).
28. See id.
29. See Council Directive 76/207, supra note 7, at art. 2.
30. See id. at art. 2(1) "1. For the purposes of the following provisions, the principle of
equal treatment shall mean that there shall be no discrimination whatsoever on grounds of
sex either directly or indirectly by reference in particular to marital or family status." Id.
31. See id. at art. 2(4): "This Directive shall be without prejudice to measures to promote
equal opportunity for men and women, in particular by removing existing inequalities which
affect women's opportunities in the areas referred to in Article 1(1)". Id.
32. Id.
33. See Means, supra note 20, at 1112.
34. See Gabriel A. Moens, Equal Opportunities Not Equal Results: "Equal Opportunity"
in European Law After Kalanke, 23 J. LEGIs. 43, 46 (1997).
35. See Case C-450/93, Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, 1995 ECJ CELEX LEXIS
3928, at *5.
36. See id. at *5.
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assistant to the Section Manager.37 Ms. Glissman held a diploma in
Landscaping Gardening and had also been employed by the Parks
Department since 1975 as a horticulture employee.38
After the staff employment committee refused to give its
recommendation to Mr. Kalanke, he appealed their decision to an arbitration
committee.39 This committee then made a recommendation in Mr. Kalanke' s
favor.4° Despite this recommendation, the Staff Committee appealed to the
conciliation board, which held that both candidates were equally qualified
and therefore, that preference should be given to the woman in accordance
with the Landesgleichstellungsgesetz ("LGG") (Bremen Law on Equal
Treatment for Men and Women in the Public Service). Mr. Kalanke
appealed this decision to the Bundesarbeitsgericht (German Supreme Labor
Court),42 which held that the resolution depended essentially on the
applicability of the LGG, and sought a ruling on this issue from the ECJ.
43
The ECJ determined that the LGG was not applicable under Article 2(4)
of the Equal Treatment Directive and, therefore, violated Article 2(1) of the
Directive.' The ECJ based its ruling on two principle arguments. 45 First, the
ECJ found that the LGG was "not proportionate to the goal of promoting





41. Gesetz sur Gleichstellung von Frau und Mann im Offentlichen Dienst des Landes
Bremen [hereinafter "the LGG"]. See Case C-450/93, Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen,
1995 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 3928, at *5. The LGG provides in pertinent part that:
Appointment, assignment to an official post and promotion
(1) In the case of an appointment which is not made for training purposes,
women who have the same qualifications as men applying for the same post
are to be given priority in sectors where they are under-represented...
(4) Qualifications are to be evaluated exclusively in accordance with the
requirements of the occupation, post to be filled or career bracket. Specific
experience and capabilities, such as those acquired as a result of family
work, social commitment or unpaid activity, are part of the qualifications are
within the meaning of subparagraph[s] (1) [and (2)] if they are of use in
performing the duties of the position in question.
(5) There is under-representation if women do not make up at least half of
the staff in the individual pay, remuneration and salary brackets in the
relevant personnel group in the department. Id.
42. See Kalanke, 1995 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 3928, at *8.
43. See id.
44. See Brems, supra note 3, at 669.
45. See id.
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'absolute and unconditional priority for appointment or promotion. '
Secondly, the ECJ believed that the Bremen system was not aimed towards
the goal of promoting equal opportunity, but rather, that the LGG
"substituted for the equality of opportunity envisaged by Article 2(4), the
result of equal representation of the sexes in a given position. 47
The ruling in Kalanke struck down any "tie break" schemes that would
give an equally qualified woman preference over her male counterpart.48
This rationale placed a negative implication over all affirmative action
programs and left the EU wondering what, if any, positive action programs
for women could be saved.49
C. Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-Westfallen
The future of affirmative action for women was secured in November of
1997 when the ECJ decided Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-Westfallen.5 ° The
ECJ used this case to explain "whether a narrowly tailored positive action
program for women is permissible under the European Community
Directive. ,51
Mr. Hellmut Marschall worked as a tenured teacher for Land Nordrhein-
Westfallen ("Land"), and was salaried as a "basic grade" in career bracket
A12.52 When he applied for a promotion to an A13 post at Gesamtschule
Schwerte, however, he was informed that the Bezirksregierung, or District
Authority, wanted to place a woman in that position.53
Paragraph 25(5) of the Beamtengesetz fur das Land Nordrhein-
Westfallen54 (Law on Civil Servants of the Land) ("Law of Civil Servants")
provides that when there are fewer women than men in a given position,
women are to be given priority if the man and woman are equally qualified,
46. Id. (quoting Kalanke, 1995 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 3928, at * 13).
47. Id.(emphasis added).
48. See Mertus, supra note 10, at 296.
49. See Brems, supra note 3, at 670.
50. Marschall, 1997 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 5439.
51. Mertus, supra note 10, at 296.
52. See Marschall, 1997 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 5439, at *8.
53. See id.
54. Id. at *6-7.
2000]
and if there are no factors that tip the balance in favor of the man.
51
Accordingly, Marschall was denied the promotion.
56
Marschall filed a complaint that the District Authority rejected based on
its reading of 25(5) of the Law of Civil Servants.57 Marschall then brought
legal proceedings before the Verwaltungsgericht Gelsenkichen
("Administrative Court") seeking an order requiring the Land to promote
him. 58 The Administrative Court, finding that Marschall and the female
candidate were equally qualified, held that the outcome depended on the
consistency of 25(5) of the Law of Civil Servants and Article 2(l) and (4) of
the Directive. 59 Relying on Kalanke, the Administrative Court held that the
priority afforded to women under 25(5) of the Law of Civil Servants
constituted discrimination within the meaning of Article 2(1) of the
Directive,6" and that "such discrimination is not eliminated by the possibility
of giving preference, exceptionally, to male candidates."61  The
Administrative Court also believed that Section 25(5) of the Law of Civil
Servants did not improve a woman's ability to compete with men in the
employment market, nor did it level the playing fields.62 Rather, Section
25(5) of the Law of Civil Servants directly conflicted with Article 2(4) by
prescribing a result, rather than allowing for a measure that promotes
equality of opportunity.63 Due to the questions raised by Section 25(5) of the
Law of Civil Servants, the Administrative Court stayed the proceeding and
referred the issues in dispute to the ECJ for clarification. 4
All member countries of the EU, with the exception of France and the
United Kingdom (UK), took the view that provision 25(5) of the Law of Civil
Servants did not guarantee "absolute and unconditional priority for women"
and therefore did not exceed the limits set forth in Kalanke.65 In contrast,
55. See id. at *7. ("Where, in the sector of the authority responsible for promotion, there
are fewer women than men in the particular higher grade post in the career bracket, women
are to be given priority for promotion in the event of equal suitability, competence and
professional performance, unless reasons specific to an individual male candidate tilt the
balance in his favour." (emphasis added)).





61. Id. at *9-10.
62. See id. at *10.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id. at * 12.
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France and the UK found that provision 25(5) of the Law of Civil Servants
went beyond promoting equality of opportunity and aimed more at equality
of representation, a measure squarely in conflict with Article 2(1) and with
the ruling in Kalanke.66
The ECJ held that any provision that gives automatic preference to a
female candidate is inherently discriminatory.67 However, the ECJ found
that, unlike the provisions in Kalanke, provision 25(5) of the Law of Civil
Servants contained an Offnungsklausel ("savings clause") mandating that a
woman not be given priority over a male candidate if there were "reasons
specific to an individual male candidate [that] tilt the balance in his favour.
68
It was this savings clause that distinguished the provision in Marschall from
the provision in Kalanke and made the law acceptable to the ECJ.69
Article 2(4) is designed to create measures that, although are
discriminatory in appearance, in fact are "intended to eliminate or reduce
actual instances of inequality which may exist in the reality of social life."7 °
Article 2(4) authorizes officials to enact laws that give advantages to women
in order to put them on equal footing with their male counterparts.
71
The ECJ found that even in instances where male and female candidates
are equally qualified, male candidates tend to be promoted above the female
candidates generally, due to stereotypes and prejudices concerning the role
and capacities of women in the workforce.7 2 For instance, the ECJ looked at
the perception that women will interrupt their careers more frequently than
men due to pregnancy, childbirth, and family duties.73 The ECJ reasoned that
as a result of these perceptions, the fact that a male and female candidate are
equally qualified will not necessarily mean that they have equal chances for
employment.74
The ECJ articulated that Article 2(1) and (4) of the Directive do not
preclude a rule requiring that in cases where there are fewer women than men
in a particular post and both candidates are equally qualified, priority be
66. See id. at *12-13.




71. Article 2(4) "authorizes national measures relating to access to employment, including
promotion, which give a specific advantage to women with a view to improving their ability




74. See id. at * 16.
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given to the promotion of the female candidates75 unless "reasons specific to
an individual male candidate tilt the balance in his favour."7 6 This means
that Member States will have the freedom to devise any number of programs
benefitting women in the workplace, providing that the programs do not
amount to a fixed preference system.77
The ruling handed down by the ECJ paves the way for the "introduction
of flexible policies to promote positive discrimination [i.e. affirmative action]
for women." 7 Both the ruling in Marschall and the Directive serve as a
"starting point for building up effective instrument[s] for developing equal
opportunity policies."79
III. THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO
GENDER-BASED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
A. Johnson v. Transportation Agency of Santa Clara County
In December of 1978, the Transportation Agency of Santa Clara County,
California ("the Agency") adopted a voluntary affirmative action plan ("the
Plan") that sought as a long-term goal, that thirty-six percent of the Agency's
employment be assigned to women, minorities and handicapped.8" The Plan
provided that in "making promotions to positions within a traditionally
segregated job classification in which women have been significantly under-
75. The ECJ laid out a two-part test that the provision must withstand which provides that:
(1) In each individual case the rule provides for male candidates who are equally as
qualified as the female candidates a guarantee that the candidatures will be the subject
of an objective assessment which will take account of all criteria specific to the
individual candidates and will override the priority accorded to female candidates
where one or more of those criteria tilts the balance in favour of the male candidate,
and
(2) such criteria are not such as to discriminate against the female candidates.
See id. at 18.
76. See id. at 19.
77. See Brems, supra note 3, at 674 (citing Dagmar Scheik, Positive Action in Community
Action Law, 25 INDUSTRIAL L.J. 239, at 241 (1996)). Women's quotas without a savings
clause, called starre Frauenquote, which reserve a specific set-aside number ofjob positions
for women will be one of the alternatives no longer available to remedy the gender disparities
in the workforce. See id.
78. Europe Information Service, Equal Opportunities: Disagreements About How to
Interpret Marschall Judgment, 2286 EUR. REP., Jan. 28, 1998.
79. Id.
80. See James C. Harvey et al., Affirmative Action and Promotions: The Alabama and
California Cases, 31 How. L.J. 17,27 (1988) (citing JACKSON DAILYNEWS, Nov. 13, 1986,
at 7A).
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represented, the Agency is authorized to consider as one factor the sex of a
qualified applicant.""1
Paul Johnson, a white male, had worked for the Agency as a temporary
road dispatcher for eleven years.8 2 In 1979, Johnson applied for a permanent
position as a road dispatcher; a position in which the Agency already
employed only males.8 3
Diane Joyce, a white female who had considerable experience with the
Agency as a road yard clerk, road maintenance worker, and part-time road
dispatcher, also applied for the road yard clerk position.84 After several
screening tests and interviews, the employment examiners eventually
recommended that the Agency select Johnson for the job. 5 However,
because the Agency employed no women in the Skilled Craft position and
had never employed a woman as a road dispatcher, the Affirmative Action
Coordinator recommended that Joyce be hired.
86
Johnson filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") alleging that he had been denied the promotion based
on his sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.87 Once
the EEOC gave him a right-to-sue letter, he filed suit in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California. 8 The district court
found that Mr. Johnson had been more qualified than the female candidate
and that her sex had been the "determining factor in her selection."89 The
district court relied on the decision in United States Steelworkers ofAmerica
v. Weber9° and held that the Agency's "actions unnecessarily trammeled
Johnson's interests and had the effect of creating an absolute bar to his
promotion to the road dispatcher position.' 91
The county appealed the district court's decision arguing that the district
court had erroneously concluded that the Agency's plan was not temporary.
92
81. Johnson v. Transportation Agency of Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616, 620-21
(1987).
82. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency of Santa Clara County, 748 F.2d 1308, 1309
(9th Cir. 1984).
83. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 621.
84. See Harvey, supra note 80, at 27 (citing Johnson, 748 F. 2d. at 1309-10).
85. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 624.
86. See id.
87. See id. at 625.
88. See id.
89. Id.
90. See id. (citing United States Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979)).
91. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 748 F.2d. 1308, 1310 (9th Cir. 1984).
92. See id. at 1310.
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The Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision, finding that the
Santa Clara County affirmative action plan was "necessary and lawful" and
was tailored close enough to the rules set out in Weber.93 This meant that in
the Court of Appeal's view, Santa Clara's Plan benefitted a traditionally
underprivileged group and did not negatively affect the rights of those not in
the group.94
Johnson case was granted certiorari by the Supreme Court of the United
States. 95 The Supreme Court maintained that its decision would be guided
by the requirements laid out in Weber.96 In Weber, the Court addressed the
question of "whether the employer violated Title VII by adopting a voluntary
affirmative action plan designed to 'eliminate manifest racial imbalances in
traditionally segregated job categories." 97 Similarly to Weber, the Court in
Johnson upheld the employer's decision to "select less senior black
applicants over the white respondent" 98 finding that "taking race into account
was consistent with Title VII's objective of breaking down old patterns of
racial segregation and hierarchy." 99
The Supreme Court in Weber articulated three requirements that a
voluntary affirmative action plan must satisfy.1"0 First, the plan must be
93. See id. at 1313.
94. See id.
95. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 478 U.S. 1019 (1986).
96. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 626 (1987).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 628.
99. Id.
100. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994) as interpreted by United
States Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). An employer's affirmative
action plan does not violate Title VII if:
1) The promotion of the female employee was undertaken to further an
affirmative action plan designed to eliminate agency work force imbalances in
traditionally segregatedjob categories through a moderate, flexible, case-by-case
approach, where the plan
(a) acknowledged the limited opportunities that existed in the past for
women to find employment in certain job classifications where
women had not been traditionally employed in significant numbers,
(b) sought to remedy these imbalances through hiring, training, and
promotion of women throughout the agency in all major job
classifications where they were underrepresented,
(c) set a long-term goal of a workforce which mirrored in its major
job classifications the percentage of women in the area labor market,
and (d) directed the formulation of annual short-term goals that would
provide a more realistic indication of the degree to which sex should
be taken into account in filling particular positions,
(2) the agency plan does not unnecessarily trammel the rights of male employees,
490 [Vol. 19
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implemented in response to an underrepresentation in the workforce.
1°0
Second, the plan must not infringe upon the rights of those not within the
underrepresented class. 0 2 Finally, the plan must serve to reach a balanced
workforce and not to serve as a mechanism of perpetuating the newly
attained balanced workforce.'0 3
The Court in Johnson found that women were significantly
underrepresented in the Skilled Craft category.'°4 Thus, the Court reasoned,
the first prong of the Weber test was met, and that it was not "unreasonable
for the Agency to determine that it was appropriate to consider as one factor,
the sex of Ms. Joyce in making its decision."'0 5 Next, the Court examined
the second prong of the test, and determined that the Agency plan did not
"unnecessarily trammel" the rights of the male employees, or create an
absolute bar to their advancement. 06 The Court determined that sex was but
one of the numerous factors the Agency took into account when choosing
Joyce.' O7 The Court also determined that the Plan required women to
compete with all other qualified applicants, and that no persons were
automatically excluded from consideration.0 8 Therefore, Joyce had no
absolute entitlement to the position.'09
Finally, in looking at the third prong of the Weber test, the Court
determined that the Plan was temporary in nature and subject to periodic
or create an absolute bar to their advancement, where
(a) the plan set aside no positions for women,
(b) the head of the agency being authorized to promote any of the
employees deemed qualified and eligible for the promotion, denial of
the promotion to a male employee unsettled no legitimate firmly
rooted expectation on his part,
(c) while he was denied the promotion, he retained his employment
with the agency, at the same salary and with the same seniority, and
remained eligible for other promotions, and
(d) the agency plan was not intended to maintain a permanent balance in the
workforce, and
(3) the agency plan embodies the contribution that voluntary employer action can
be made in eliminating the vestiges of discrimination in the workplace.
See id.
101. See Weber, 443 U.S. 193.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 637.
105. Id.
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review.° They held that based upon the wording and specifications of the
Plan, the Agency obviously had intended to "attain a balanced workforce, not
to maintain one."' l
B. The Minority Viewpoint: Justice Scalia's Dissent
in Johnson and its Impact on Future Decisions
While the Johnson decision is not as favorable towards women as the
Marschall opinion, the standard articulated is much more beneficial than
some would have wanted."' Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia
are two examples of individuals in total opposition with the result. 13 Both
have argued in the past that the Civil Rights Act should be construed as
"forbidding any activity or procedure that requires taking account of the...
sex of individuals in deciding how to treat them." ' 14 These Justices have also
maintained that the equal protection requirement of the United States
Constitution, if properly construed, prohibits governmental affirmative action
programs.115
Justice Scalia, dissenting in Johnson, argued that Weber was wrongly
decided and should have been overruled with Johnson."6 He maintained that
the decision would let loose a "flood of less qualified.., minorities upon the
workforce.""l 7 His assertion that the decision "effectively replaced the goal
of a discrimination-free society with the quite incompatible goal of
proportionate representation by race and sex in the workplace" was echoed
by the Reagan administration that believed that only actual "victims" of
discrimination should be entitled to remedy."'
In 1995, the Court again looked at the scope of the governmental
affirmative action programs in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena."9
Justices Thomas and Scalia, joined by three others, held that government
affirmative action programs must be based on a compelling interest, which
110. See id. at 639.
111. Id.




116. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 657-77 (1987).
117. Id. at 675.
118. See Harvey, supra note 80, at 31.
119. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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is narrowly tailored and will be subject to strict scrutiny. 120 While Adarand
does not outlaw affirmative action, if the conservative thinking embodied in
the ruling continues to prevail, "affirmative action programs will become
more difficult to sustain legally, just as they are becoming more difficult to
sustain politically."
' 121
Viewing the issue from this perspective, opponents of affirmative action
believe that women in the United States won a huge battle with the Johnson
decision.
122
V. A COMPARISON OF MARSCHALL AND JOHNSON
While the tests provided by Marschall and in Johnson both address
affirmative action and its relation to women, their divergent approaches yield
results that, while facially similar, have sharply different implications for
women in the workplace. 23 The most evident difference is that between the
two-prong test in Marschal1124 and the three-prong test in Johnson.
125
The overall test in Marschall requires only an objective assessment of
the candidates with criteria that do not discriminate against women.'26
Therefore, European law can permit preferential treatment of women if the
candidates are similarly qualified and no factor weighs more heavily in the
man's favor.'2 7 In contrast, the Johnson test requires the existence of a
workforce imbalance in a traditionally segregated job category. 28 The Court
in Johnson stated that the Agency could set long- and short-term goals to
mirror representation of the workforce with the population of qualified
female applicants. 129 However, the agency plan must not unnecessarily
trammel the rights of the male employees. '30 Furthermore, the Agency could
not set-aside positions for women.' 3'
120. See id. at 224.
121. BERGMANN, supra note 112, at 92.
122. See id. See also Johnson v. Transportation Agency of Santa Clara County, 480 U.S.
616, 656 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
123. Compare Marschall v. Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1997 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 5439 (1997)
with Johnson, 480 U.S. 616.
124. See Marschall, 1997 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 5439 at *7.
125. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 638.
126. See Marschall, 1997 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 5439 at *16.
127. See id. at *14.
128. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 631.
129. See id. at 635.
130. See id. at 638.
131. See id. at 638-39.
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In the European Union, the Community legislation has proven to be an
enormous "support to women's rights in the labor market in the past, and has
tremendous potential to continue to do so in the future."' 32 It is becoming
increasingly more obvious that the "under-representations of women in many
professional categories is due to structural elements which are extremely
difficult to tackle using only traditional anti-discrimination legislation."'
' 33
The decision in Marschall allows the Member States freedom to be
innovative and "create new measures based on other than strictly formal
discrimination concepts.', 134 With this more liberal approach to affirmative
action programs, employers now "need only emphasize that the female
candidate was not 'automatically' promoted and that the male candidate was
not more qualified."'35
The second prong of the Marschall test even seems to allay problems of
pretextual discrimination. 136 On its face, "any criteria for evaluation of
candidates that discriminate against women are forbidden.' ' 37  This,
assumedly, would include any "criteria that appear neutral on its face but are
discriminatory in practice," such as duration of employment or family leave
provisions.'38 Prior to Kalanke, when automatic quotas were allowed,
women were subjected to the so-called stigma of the "quota woman."1 39 As
one commentator has noted, "[i]n the political sphere, the victim was seen to
be not so much the poor male harmed by affirmative action, but the
unfortunate woman who got her job 'only' because she was a woman.'
140
The Kalanke decision brought an end to automatic preference selection
criteria, and in part, ended the portrayal of women as employees unjustifiably
gaining from quotas.141
In the wake of the Marschall decision, women are faced not with the
"hire women if' rationale, but more with "complex norms that demand
132. Brems, supra note 3, at 674-75 (citing Dagmar Schiek, Positive Action in Community
Law, 25 INDUS. L. J. 239 (1996)).
133. Brems, supra note 3 at 674.
134. Id.




139. See Susanne Baer, Women's Rights in Germany Since Unification: A Different
Approach to Jurisprudence? Feminisms in General Legal Science, Legal Cultures, and the
Ambivalence of Law, 3 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 251, 275 n. l 0 (citing MARTHA MINOW,
MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND AMERICAN LAW (1990).
140. Id. at 275.
141. See Mertus, supra note 10, at 300.
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recognition of the child-raising experience, care of families and elder
persons, and unpaid social work as qualifications for most jobs, or as factors
upon which a decision not to hire may not be based."1 42 This forces
employers to evaluate male and female applicants seriously and fairly.1
43
Unlike the EU, the United States has not been as eager to embrace
affirmative action programs that permit gender to be a determinative
factor.' While the ECJ has now spoken on the concept of implementing
programs that require a woman to be hired if all other qualifications are
equal, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that a woman's gender may be taken
into account if it is only one factor in the hiring decision.
45
The common theme delivered by both the ECJ and the U.S. Supreme
Court is that automatic quotas will not pass muster under either of the tests
enunciated. Furthermore, studies have shown that these automatic quotas do
little to increase the representation of women in the labor market.146
Evidence reveals that equal opportunity does not guarantee equality. 
147
As one commentator has stated, "[o]ccupational disparities and severe job-
segregation are pervasive in the United States despite the availability of equal
employment opportunity and compensatory devices to remedy individual
instances of discrimination."1 48 Despite these disparities, the Supreme Court
has not yet been willing to embrace an approach as flexible as the Marschall
decision. 149 The Supreme Court is more apt to view a woman's gender as a
"plus" to her application that would not "insulate the individual from
comparison with all other candidates for the available [positions]." 50
Experts in the study of affirmative action have become increasingly
convinced that the underrepresentation of women in many professional
occupations is due to "structural elements which are extremely difficult to
tackle using only traditional anti-discrimination legislation."1 '' Unlike the
142. Id.
143. See id.
144. See generally Johnson, 480 U.S. 616.
145. See generally id. and Marschall, 1997 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 5439.
146. Cf George E. Johnson & Gary R. Solon, The Attainment of Pay Equity Betwen the
Sexes by Legal Means: An Economic Analysis, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 183 (1986).
147. See Deidre A.Grossman, Voluntary Affirmative Action Plans in Italy and the United
States: Differing Notions of Gender Equality, 14 COMP. LAB. L. 185, 219, n. 154.
148. Id. (citing Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, Symposium, Women 'sRights, Affirmative Action,
and the Myth ofIndividualism, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 338, 339 (1996)).
149. See BERGMANN, supra note 112, at 92.
150. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 638 (citing Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 317 (1978)).
151. Brems, supra note 3, at 674.
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United States, The European Union has recognized this dilemma, and left its
countries the freedom to design programs favoring women providing that
these programs fairly evaluate the candidates and give no automatic
preference to any one candidate.'52 This idea advanced by the ECJ goes
much further in promoting women in the workplace than the "strictly formal
discrimination concepts"' 153 adhered to by the Supreme Court. The ECJ has
taken a bold step in the direction of equalizing the sexes in the workforce by
allowing its members to determine for themselves how and when affirmative
action measures will be taken.
54
Vl. CONCLUSION
While it is clear that the United States still provides for affirmative
action programs within the strict parameters of Johnson, it is questionable
whether the United States will ever have as liberal of a standard as the
European Union. Prevailing attitudes in the United States, coupled with the
Supreme Court's ever-tightening restrictions, make it less likely that
affirmative action will be the remedy for leveling the playing field.'55
It still remains to be seen if the standard articulated in Marschall will be
applied as loosely in the future. With such a flexible standard, enforcement
may prove difficult,'56 and discrimination easier to mask with the "savings
clause."'157 However, these are adjustments that the ECJ can easily make by
fine-tuning the requirements of its test.
The United States should take a cue from the EU and embrace the reality
that affirmative action programs, as applied under Weber, 15 have been
152. See id.
153. Id.
154. See generally id.
155. For commentary on individual state's reactions to, and trends concerning, affirmative
action programs, see Pete Wilson, The Minority-Majority Society, in THE AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION DEBATE 167-174 (George E. Curry ed., 1996), in support of the California Civil
Rights Initiative, a law outlawing all affirmative action programs in the state. See also,
Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 2581 (invalidating
the University of Texas Law School's affirmative action program for admitting students).
156. See Mertus, supra note 10, at 300. It appears that the second prong articulated in
Marschall should satisfy critics who argue that it is structural and systematic problems that
deter a woman's chances of succeeding and advancing in the workforce. Read broadly,
criteria that are neutral on their face, such as seniority or continuous employment
requirements, but have a disparate impact on women will now evidence potential
discrimination against women, and will be forbidden.
157. See id.
158. SeegenerallyUnitedStatesSteelworkersofAmericav. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
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relatively ineffective in increasing the proportion of women in traditionally
underrepresentedjob categories. By opening up the restrictions on voluntary
affirmative action programs, and allowing for a "savings clause" type of rule,
the United States Supreme Court could make even greater progress toward
leveling the playing field for women in the United States.
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